Tibet, Nationalism, and the “West”: Questioning Economic and Political Modernity by Veg, Sebastian
 China Perspectives 
2009/3 | 2009
The Deadlock in Tibet
Tibet, Nationalism, and the “West”: Questioning
Economic and Political Modernity
Sebastian Veg
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/4859
ISSN : 1996-4617
Éditeur
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 1 septembre 2009
ISSN : 2070-3449
 
Référence électronique
Sebastian Veg, « Tibet, Nationalism, and the “West”: Questioning Economic and Political Modernity », 
China Perspectives [En ligne], 2009/3 | 2009, mis en ligne le 01 septembre 2012, consulté le 28 octobre
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/4859 
© All rights reserved
98 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
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In April 2008, one month after the Tibetan revolt of 14March, the Tsinghua professor of intellectual history WangHui was interviewed by Twenty-first Century Economic
Herald (Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao) about the events. He then
reworked this interview into a full-fledged essay that was pub-
lished in the Hainan journal Frontiers (Tianya (2)). This arti-
cle promised to yield some interesting insights as to the “mis-
understanding” that had developed between China and what
part of the Chinese press and the government referred to as
“the West”: Wang Hui is probably more well-read in English-
language publications dealing with China, as well as with gen-
eral problems of modern politics and culture, than most
Western sinologists could claim to be in Chinese. He is well
known for taking iconoclastic positions, critical both of the
government and of the assumptions made by some of its crit-
ics; in particular, he has repeatedly taken the Chinese leader-
ship to task over its embrace of unfettered capitalism, arguing
that the political repression it exercises has in the last 20 years
been increasingly subordinated to a policy of crony capitalism
rather than to ideology, and that liberalism alone will therefore
not solve China’s present problems. 
In May 2009, a research report prepared by four researchers
(Fang Kun, Huang Li, Li Xiang, Wang Hongzhe) for the
Gongmeng Law Research Center appeared on the internet,
entitled “Investigation of the Social and Economic Causes of
the 14 March Incident in Tibetan Areas,” which represents
the most thorough field inquiry to date into how the revolts
of 2008 were experienced and understood by local popula-
tions in Tibetan areas. (3) Prepared by a non-governmental
organisation run by several prominent lawyers and law profes-
sors active in the rights defence movement (weiquan yun-
dong), which has since been shut down on tax charges by the
Beijing authorities, who have also formally arrested its direc-
tor Xu Zhiyong, (4) this report drew much attention. Its open-
ing statement describes the revolts in the following way: 
Such a large social contradiction could not have been
created solely by external factors. There must be
internal causes, but media reports have given little
detailed consideration to investigating the social roots
of these violent incidents. Under the influence of
nationalist sentiment, there were some reports that
even broadened mistrust and mutual criticism
between the nationalities. The lack of field research
into the living conditions of Tibetans has been detri-
mental to clearly understanding the nature of the
social contradictions in Tibetan areas on a theoretical
level, and has been detrimental to resolving problems
on a practical level. (Foreword) 
In addition to religious and ethnic discontent, the authors
mention the “rise of China” and its influence on Tibet as
factors in the protests, pinpointing the fact that “this hurried
process of modernization and the path it has taken are not
the result of choices made by Tibetans of their own volition;
there were very many powerful external forces at play” 
(I, introduction).
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1. The author would like to thank William Nee and Françoise Robin for commenting on the
paper; and Wang Hui for providing the revised version of his article. 
2. Wang Hui, “Dongfang zhuyi, minzu quyu zizhi yu zunyan zhengzhi – guanyu ‘Xizang
wenti’ de yidian sikao” (Orientalism, Self-rule of ethnic areas, and the politics of digni-
ty—a few thoughts about the ‘Tibet problem,’” Tianya (Frontiers), 2008, no. 4 (July
2008), pp. 173-191. Page numbers in parentheses refer to this article; when they are
preceded by “revised,” they refer to the unpublished manuscript ("Dong Xi Zhijian de
'Xizang wenti'; The "Tibetan problem" between East and West; 53pp) provided by the
author and to be published by Kaifang Shidai (Open Times). Since the Tianyi website
(www.tecn.cn) was shut down in early July 2009, only a slightly expanded version is
available online via the Utopia website: http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class17/
200807/44904.html. The original interview with Economic Herald, which appeared on
28 April, is also available at: http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class17/200806/
40777.html (All websites last accessed on 13 August 2009).
3. Gongmeng (Open Constitution Initiative) Law Research Center, Zangqu 3.14 shijian shehui
jingji chengyin diaocha baogao (Investigation of the Social and Economic Causes of the 14
March Incident in Tibetan areas), https://docs.google.com/Doc?id=df4nrxxq
_91ctcf6sck. The version on Woeser’s blog also contains Appendix I, missing on the
Google site: http://woeser.middle-way.net/2009/05/314.html. An English translation was
prepared by the International Campaign for Tibet, but is marred by several elementary
translations errors (such as “ethnic state” for minzu guojia, rather than “nation-state”; the
first author is given as Li Kun rather than Fang Kun, etc.); it is available at
www.savetibet.org/print/2197. Quotations from the report are followed by the reference in
the internal structure of the report, as there are no stable page numbers). Research for the
report was carried out in Tibetan areas in the TAR and Amdo (Qinghai and Gansu province);
unfortunately it seems the researchers did not (could not?) visit Kham.
4. For example, Reuters, “Gongmeng rights lawyer arrested,” South China Morning Post,
19 August 2009, p. A6.
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Wang Hui reworked and considerably expanded his original
paper after the publication of this report, which he quotes
several times, and it is tempting to think that it influenced his
thinking more than appears on the surface. Indeed, on sev-
eral important points, Wang Hui’s reworked paper consider-
ably inflects his original position in keeping with findings by
the Gongmeng Initiative, in particular on the importance of
the religious dimension of Tibetan society; on the unique
nature of inequalities in Tibetan areas, in that they espouse
ethnic fracture lines; and on the feeling of disempowerment
of Tibetans due to the massive influx of migrants, in partic-
ular to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), which he ear-
lier likened to “the problem of migrants in any major
Chinese city”—in the revised version this is designated as the
“main spark” of the March riots. The closeness in vocabu-
lary is particularly striking in the following passage of the
introduction, which in the earlier version chided only
Western public opinion:
Western public opinion immediately focused on
Lhasa, the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan clique,
while Chinese official media began attacking
Western public opinion; both focused on the violence
and the action of the overseas Tibetan independence
movement, and very rarely discussed the reasons for
the 14 March events from the viewpoint of a social
crisis. […] Even more importantly: why do both of
the reactions described above focus on nationalism,
and not on the social conditions that produced the
Tibetan crisis? (Revised version, p. 1)
Despite these important additions, the conceptual frame-
work remains generally unchanged, as Wang Hui uses key
notions developed in other essays to shed light on the con-
tradictions of Tibet, in particular his critique of the
empire/nation-state dichotomy developed in the four-volume
The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought, and his views on
“depoliticised politics” inspired by Carl Schmitt (see below
notes 8 and 18). The present paper therefore refers to both
the article originally published in Tianya and the expanded
version kindly provided by the author—especially as the for-
mer was widely circulated on the Internet, while the latter
has yet to be published. While in the earlier version there is
a strong emphasis on Western double standards (fascination
with Tibet and support for exiled Tibetan groups), the final
version adopts a more balanced approach, providing much
additional data and delving into the details of the “social cri-
sis” in Tibet.
Neither Wang Hui nor the Gongmeng researchers—and
even less the present reviewer—purport to be experts on
Tibet; tibetologists will no doubt have much to add and to
criticise in the writings discussed, and in the present article.
However, these two publications by important actors in the
internal debate in China—critical intellectuals within the aca-
demic system and non-governmental civil rights groups—are
worthy of interest in their own right, in that they demon-
strate the urgency of the challenges posed by the Tibetan
deadlock to Chinese intellectuals and, despite the lack of
public discussion on ethnic minorities acknowledged by
Wang Hui (revised version, p. 47, n. 93), attest to the pos-
sibility for debate within China on the question of Tibet and
government policy in Tibet. For this reason at least, it
seemed worthwhile to discuss them. Both papers, in differ-
ent ways, also use the Tibetan revolts to address more gen-
eral questions of modernisation and China’s present attitude
to it, as well as Chinese nationalism and policies towards
ethnic minorities in China. The “West” looms large in the
background, especially in Wang Hui’s analysis, but also
more generally as a force promoting “modernity” in other
areas of the world. Wang Hui’s paper is organised into sec-
tions discussing Western Orientalism; the question of the
nation-state and the Chinese political system (resting on the
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The receipt for confiscated documents provided to
Gongmeng by the Beijing Civil Affairs Administration.
The Tibet Report is listed on lines 2 and 6. 
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principle of duoyuan yiti, or “unity in diversity”); and the
“post-revolutionary,” “depoliticised” environment in which
the “Tibet problem” began to fester, in his opinion. The
Gongmeng report also investigates the question of “moderni-
sation” in the post-1979 era and the structures of gover-
nance, and ends with two sections on the government‘s
“errors” in handling the revolts and the challenges faced by
Tibetan culture and religion today. The  “W es ter n”  na tio n-sta teand col onia li sm
Wang Hui’s paper opens with a long section on
“Orientalism,” i.e., how Western understanding and mythi-
fication of Tibet, as well as colonialism, has distorted the
nature of the Tibetan problem. The expanded version dis-
tinguishes between “two types” of Orientalism, positive and
negative. Wang Hui quotes a series of examples to prove
Western obsession with Tibet: CIA involvement in Tibet in
the 1950s (quoting Melvyn Goldstein and Tom Grunfeld),
the presence of Western missionaries, the widespread per-
ception that Tibet is a peaceful country, the Enlightenment
critique of Tibetan “superstition” (Hegel) and, in reaction,
the esoteric nineteenth century mystic school known as
“theosophy” founded by Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891). A
bizarre conflation occurs at this point: Wang Hui analyses
Blavatsky’s fascination with Tibet, which she falsely
claimed to have visited before converting to Buddhism in
Sri Lanka; he then adds that the theosophy movement
under Blavatsky developed a racialist theory of four original
human species migrating out of Shambala, of which
Tibetans are the last before the emergence of mankind. He
adds that Blavatsky’s racialism was instrumental in creating
the image of a (racially) pure Tibet, uncontaminated by the
evils of modern civilisation, in the eyes of many nineteenth
and early twentieth century European intellectuals and, he
suggests, exercised a decisive influence on Hitler and
Nazism, for which Tibetans were the ancestors of the
Aryans. He also recalls that Himmler sponsored the third
expedition to Tibet in 1938 by the German ornithologist
Ernst Schäfer, who had joined the SS in 1933. He high-
lights the importance of Tibet in Western pop culture, as
embodied in James Hilton’s novel Lost Horizon and the
film Seven Years in Tibet, adapted from a book by
Heinrich Harrer, a former Nazi and colleague of Schäfer’s,
who lived in Lhasa from 1946 to 1951, where he befriend-
ed the 14th Dalai Lama as a teenager. Although the details
do not purport to be more than anecdotal, they serve to pre-
pare the argument that nationalism is a Western invention,
and suggest a deeper affinity between nationalism, Nazism,
and racialist worldviews: (5)
To the present day, Western society has still not shed
this kind of Orientalist knowledge: those people who
feel despair at the state of their own society and the
contemporary world easily find spiritual consolation in
the image of Tibet, but they never paid attention to
the fact that their “theosophy” and their “extra-senso-
ry techniques” not only distorted Tibet’s reality and
history, but could also hurt those Chinese people who
were welcoming them with open arms. The Chinese
did not know that they were faced with a bunch of
Westerners deeply penetrated by several centuries of
Orientalist knowledge, and that Tibet was precisely
the artificially constructed Other inherent in them or
in their Self. When Westerners realised the distance
that separated the real Tibet from their creation, their
bitterness erupted spontaneously—Tibet/the Orient
was the prerequisite for their construction of their
Self: now that this Other had suddenly freed itself
from them, where could they find another one?
Without a doubt, in this globalised world, Shambala
has long disappeared. If they have lost faith in their
own world, they will not find faith in any corner of it.
(p. 176-177; revised p. 13)
In the revised version, these critiques are mitigated by a
more substantial analysis of the Orientalism that has devel-
oped within Chinese society with regard to Tibet, suggested
in the first paper through the case of Zhongdian in Yunnan
Province, renamed as Shangri-La and transformed into a
tourist destination. 
It should be pointed out that one could just as easily argue that
the West is and has been fascinated with China in an even
more intense and long-lasting manner than with Tibet (includ-
ing through the presence of countless missionaries). The feel-
ing of “spiritual void” that Wang Hui discerns in Western soci-
ety expresses itself at least as much in fascination with
Chinese philosophy as with Tibetan Buddhism, and in addi-
tion is also strong in Chinese pop culture (films like Kekexili
by Lu Chuan, 2004). It should furthermore be remembered
that racialist discourse was widespread in Europe, as it was in
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5. For a rebuttal of these views, see for example Isrun Engelhardt, “The Nazis of Tibet: A
twentieth century myth,” in Monica Esposito (ed.), Images of Tibet in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries, Paris, Ecole française d’Extrême Orient, 2008.
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Asia, in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth
century (Wang Hui is certainly familiar with Zou Rong’s
Revolutionary Army in which the Manchus are described as
a “furry and horned race” (6)); it seems somewhat anachronis-
tic to project this worldview on the present-day, post-World
War II and post-decolonisation Western world without men-
tioning that even within Europe, each country has different
views of how ethnicity relates to nationality. This use of the
word “Orientalism” goes beyond Said’s indictment of
Western academia (which Wang Hui has no major quarrel
with); rather, he uses it to single out Western public opinion (7)
while at the same time recognising that a similarly mythical
understanding of Tibet is pervasive in China—all in all, a
somewhat impressionistic use of the concept.
Wang Hui’s second main point is related to political struc-
tures and the historical relationship between Beijing and
Lhasa. It opens with the assertion, “The problem of
‘Tibetan independence’ is entirely a product of modern colo-
nialism; this point has been amply researched and backed up
by many scholars” (p. 177). Although he initially quotes
British colonial influence and Cold War politics, Wang Hui
in fact analyses this question on a theoretical rather than an
historical level, making the assertion that Western “imperial-
ism” brought with it and introduced to Asia Western concep-
tions of sovereignty based exclusively on the nation-state.
Wang Hui has previously made this point in several differ-
ent contexts, making interesting criticisms of the
empire/nation-state dichotomy and arguing that China’s
“modernisation” did not take place along these lines. (8) In
this instance he adds the concept of “trans-systemic society”
(kua tixi shehui) to describe China, which remained within
its imperial borders while developing into a nation-state
(revised, p. 15). 
This argument can only be made indirectly, as colonialism
has a tense relationship with the nation-state model, which
was invoked by independence movements against colonial
powers during the decolonisation period, and Wang Hui
does not entirely spell out how he views the connection
between the two. Ernest Gellner’s famous definition of
nationalism as the “superposition of national and political
borders” is quoted, but in a misleading way: this nationalism
does not refer to colonialism in Gellner’s book, but rather—
one might almost say on the contrary—to the nationalism that
emerged in continental Europe and was primarily directed
against supra-national empires very similar to the Qing
empire. (9) Asian reality, Wang Hui concludes, was in any
case much more complex, with relations between entities
such as “allegiance” (chen shu) or “tribute” (chao gong). In
the revised paper, providing considerable amounts of histor-
ical data, he puts forth the argument that the British policy
of “unequal treaties” was designed to destroy these tradition-
al relations between entities. (10) This is nuanced by the
description of how the Qing government used religion to
control various border areas, and how nationalism was used
by the Chinese revolutionary movement to oppose the
Qing—although Wang Hui is careful to add that Chinese
nationalism was mainly “anti-imperialist” and shed its anti-
Manchu discourse immediately after 1911. While such com-
plexities are historically undisputable, an obvious objection
that is not addressed is that it was the government of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) that ultimately tried to
impose the “nation-state model” on Tibet in a much more
immediate way than any British or American attempt to gain
influence in Tibet, at the latest when the preservation of the
Tibetan political system enshrined in the 17-Point
Agreement of 1951 ended with the dissolution of the
Tibetan government on 28 March 1959, and the creation of
the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965. T he  Chi nes e sys tem  ofa uto nom ous ar ea s
Wang Hui then sets out a detailed defence of what he
believes was Zhou Enlai’s uniquely Chinese administrative
solution to the “nationality problem”: 
In my opinion, the view of China established in accor-
dance with nationalist ideas cannot explain the unique
reality of the autonomy system in China’s ethnic
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6. See also Frank Dikötter (ed.), with Barry Sautman, The Construction of Racial Identities
in China and Japan, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1997.
7. Wang Hui pinpoints popular support for the intervention of Western governments in Tibet.
However, one might note that the most significant of these interventions, the one by the CIA,
was neither motivated by nor justified in the name of the purity of Tibetan culture, but was
a covert anti-communist operation that remained largely insulated from public opinion. 
8. See Wang Hui, “The Liberation of the Object and the Interrogation of Modernity:
Rethinking The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought,” in Modern China, vol. 34, no. 1
(January 2008), pp. 114-140, in particular 123-133.
9. The Qing empire was not originally “Chinese” and, as Wang Hui himself points out,
remained in many ways atypical (ibid. p. 132). Wang Hui designates this nationalism as one
of the causes of the dislocation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but also, surprisingly, of
the separation between India and Pakistan, which again places it in an uneasy connection
with colonialism (it seems difficult to assert that India and Pakistan were two distinct
nations forcibly united by British colonialism). In the earlier version of the paper the sugges-
tion seems to be that Western colonial powers tried to organise colonized territories into
“national” boundaries, or that they tried to govern supranational entities as one nation—
but this would not apply to China, which was never colonised.
10. An interesting comparison might be with Korea, which was “encroached on” and then
colonised at about the same time as the British set their sights on Tibet but, as it had been
“truly” colonised, it never “reverted” to China despite the defeat of Japan in World War II.
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regions [minzu quyu zizhi zhidu]—this system is dif-
ferent from both the political principles of ethnic
nationalism [zuyi minzu zhuyi de zhengzhi yuanze]
and from the model of multi-national states [duoyuan
minzu guojia de moxing]—such as, for example, fed-
eral republics that are constituted in accordance with
the principle of national self-determination.” (p. 178) 
He quotes a 1957 speech by Zhou Enlai (“Minzu quyu
zizhi you liyu minzu tuanjie he gongtong jinbu” or “The
autonomy of ethnic regions benefits the unity between eth-
nic groups and common progress”), highlighting the differ-
ence between the Soviet situation that, because of the geo-
graphical separation of ethnic groups, was conducive to a
federal solution, and the Chinese one, in which ethnic
groups were inextricably intertwined from a geographical
point of view. For this reason, Zhou rejected a federation of
ethnically homogeneous entities for fear that the Han would
migrate massively to non-ethnic areas. Wang adds that in
1949, the area of the present TAR was administered as
three separate entities (one governed by the Dalai Lama,
one by the Panchen Lama, and one by the Chamdo revolu-
tionary liberation committee), which the Panchen Lama
suggested retaining as three autonomous regions, and that it
was in fact the Central Government that recognised the rel-
atively homogeneous character of these Tibetan areas and
decided to reunify them by creating the TAR, thereby mak-
ing an exception to its own rule of accommodating the
Tibetans. (11) This is of course also an implicit argument
against an autonomous "Greater Tibet" within China.
The Maoist system of multi-ethnic autonomous regions was
governed by two principles: the coexistence of ethnically dif-
ferent populations on the local level (down to the township
or xiang level), and the will not to isolate ethnic minorities,
in order to prevent their economic marginalisation (as in the
case of native American reservations). In Wang Hui’s view,
the latter was decisive for Zhou Enlai. (12) He relates the pol-
icy of autonomy to political theories of important modern
thinkers: Kang Youwei in his 1902 article “On self-govern-
ment by citizens” (Gongmin zizhi pian) had already pro-
posed that China would be best governed by granting auton-
omy to each township (xiang); the famous Republican-era
historian Gu Jiegang  had shown that the idea of a “Han
nation” was a pure construction (in Central problems in writ-
ing Chinese history); Fei Xiaotong’s “Theory of unity in
diversity” (duoyuan yiti shuo) was meant to highlight that
even each ethnic autonomous area would itself be ethnically
diverse. In this respect, he argues, the Mao/Zhou solution
of large-scale, ethnically integrated autonomous areas was a
legacy of China’s specific history; in the revised article he
adds that it may be seen as “an inheritance of the empire,
and a mix of nation-state and socialist values” (revised, p.
25). He goes so far as to underline that the officially recog-
nised ethnic groups that emerged from the application and
research process (shi bie) of the 1950s often had little if any
consciousness of themselves as such collective entities.
However, he underscores that the most important aspect of
this system to him is that the unitary (yiti) aspect of the
nation is purely political: it rests on adhesion (similar to
Renan’s idea of the nation as a daily plebiscite) and not on
ethnic identities.
We can easily share Wang Hui’s concern with a breakdown
of China along ethnic lines. It will perhaps be more difficult
to convince a European reader familiar with the ethnic
mosaics of the Balkans or the Caucasus that a multiethnic
reality on the local level is a uniquely Chinese phenomenon.
He also seems to underestimate the influence of Stalin’s
nationality policy on the new PRC administration, in partic-
ular the mosaic system whereby each autonomous entity was
in turn broken down into smaller autonomous entities—it is
hard to argue, at least in the case of the Soviet Union, that
this principle was not inspired by the will to divide and
rule. (13) He does not distinguish between the present-day
TAR and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),
where Tibetans and Uyghurs occupied an overwhelming
majority of the population in 1949, (14) and other, ethnically
more diverse autonomous regions and areas. 
Here the Gongmeng report seems more daring: highlighting
102 N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
11. This does not seem entirely factual; according to Melvyn Goldstein: “After the defeat of
the Tibetan army in Chamdo in October 1950, the entire Chamdo region was reorgan-
ized under the administrative control of a liberation committee that was established on
19 October 1950 directly under the State Council in Beijing.” (A History of modern Tibet,
vol. 2, p. 208, n. 5). Many thanks to Françoise Robin for pointing this out.
12. Wang Hui also highlights the influence exercised by non-Han communists within the
CCP after the Long March passed through many ethnically diversified areas.
13. This view is put forth by Peking University professor Ma Rong: “The Chinese leaders,
who were extremely inexperienced in administrative matters, had to seek support from
the Soviet Union. They copied almost all the Soviet models in terms of administration,
education, the economy, and military affairs. The government also followed the Soviet
model by politicizing and institutionalizing the ethnic minorities in China.” Ma Rong, “A
New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic Relations in the Twenty-First Century:
‘Depoliticization’ of Ethnicity in China,” Asian Ethnicity, vol. 8, No. 3 (October 2007), pp.
199-217; p. 213. Ma Rong also uses the term “politicisation” to refer to the process by
which ethnic questions in the USSR and Maoist China were framed only in class terms;
as opposed to “culturalisation,” rooted in traditional China, and dominant today in dis-
cussion of ethnic issues in the United States, for example—Wang Hui would probably
see this as an example of “depoliticisation.” 
14. Uyghurs represented over 75% of the population in Xinjiang in 1949, according to
Graham Fuller and Jonathan Lipmann, “Islam in Xinjiang” in Frederick Starr, China’s
Muslim Borderland, Armonk, ME Sharpe, 2004, p. 323; Tibetans still occupy more than
90% of the population in the TAR today, according to official figures. 
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the traditional Confucian attitude of jiaohua (“civilisation”
of Barbarians), it notes that there are historical pre-condi-
tions for a lack of legitimacy of Chinese presence, especial-
ly in U-Tsang (Weizang, central Tibet, roughly equivalent to
the TAR), which, unlike Amdo, remained entirely
“untouched” by the Chinese administrative system before
the 1950s. Using an astute formulation to tread on very sen-
sitive ground, the report concludes: 
In the descriptions given by a large portion of the U-
Tsang elite, modernization did not appear as a natural
part of the modernization implemented in the entire
country, but the result of compulsion from the political
authorities on the central plains. Under the influence of
the modern notion of “ethnic self-determination,” part
of the overseas U-Tsang elite regarded the Centre/U-
Tsang relationship as one of mere “religious conferral,”
thus producing the illusion of a “state.” (III.1)
The report further mentions the exclusion of populations in bor-
der regions from the status of “subjects” or “citizens” in Qing or
Republican times, and the attitude of cultural superiority adopted
by the representatives of Chinese power in Lhasa. 
Wang Hui’s insistence in the revised paper that the system
of autonomous regions should not be traded for a simple sys-
tem of “formal equality” is certainly worth endorsing
(revised, p. 48); however, he entirely omits discussing the
implications of the autonomy status itself and its implemen-
tation: are the provisions in articles 111-122 of the Chinese
Constitution sufficient guarantees of autonomy, and have
they been consistently implemented since 1949? (15) This
lack of critical analysis is somewhat surprising for someone
who denounces the “formalistic” character of the modern
legal system that is currently expanding in China (for exam-
ple on p. 187). To quote but one example, how does Kang
Youwei’s (or Zhang Binglin’s, or Liu Shipei’s) ideal of gov-
ernment by small, autonomous, local structures relate to the
“democratic centralism” enshrined in the CCP charter,
which takes precedence over the Chinese constitution,
including its provisions on ethnic autonomy? Finally, if the
central government was so concerned with ethnic unity, why
did it go about the hugely complex and costly process of
identifying and certifying 55 “nationalities” and inscribing
every citizen’s ethnic identity in all official documents, using
the word “minzu,” the most common equivalent of the
English word “nation” and similar words in other Western
languages? Why can the Party Secretary of an Autonomous
region never be a member of an ethnic minority (with the
notable historic exception of Ulanhu in Inner Mongolia from
1947 until he was purged in 1966)? The Gongmeng report,
by contrast, strongly recommends boosting the role of “eth-
nic cadres” in all areas of administration (III.2). It seems
hard to believe Wang Hui’s claim that it is Western colonial
or Orientalist discourse that somehow imposed the concept
of national or ethnic identity on the Chinese polity, where-
as Zhou Enlai and the CCP were concerned with maintain-
ing the multiethnic reality that existed in the Chinese tradi-
tion: much rather, his own argument seems to prove that it
was the CCP, no doubt via the Soviet model, that imposed
this “Western,” nationality-based discourse onto a reality
that, indeed, had little need or use for it. 
In the Gongmeng report, by contrast, as early as the fore-
word, the authors underscore the need to “evolve from
being concerned with nationalities from the macro-perspec-
tive of building a nation-state, to being concerned with real
problems such as the basic livelihoods of the masses in eth-
nic minority areas, the protection of their rights and inter-
ests, and the fostering of civic awareness and long-term
social development” (Foreword). It is not the framework
itself so much as its capacity to address the real challenges
posed by non-Han areas that should take precedence. For
example, regarding “equality,” the report notes that
“Tibetan ethnic awareness was actually inspired by the 3.14
incident. This was especially because after the incident and
before the Olympics, a series of ‘preventative measures’
adopted by the government, such as Tibetans receiving
‘special treatment’ at airports and public spaces in the inte-
rior, made the Tibetan people, and in particular the youth,
sense their ‘differences’ even more obviously” (II.3). 
Furthermore, despite the large autonomy nominally
devolved to local governments and their obligation to incor-
porate local culture and history into the education offered
in these areas, the report highlights that all Tibetan text-
books are simple translations of Chinese ones, making no
mention of Tibetan history or even cultural specificities
such as the Tibetan calendar (II.4). The report therefore
recommends a substantial revision of the autonomy status,
stressing that local power has been monopolised by “deep-
rooted local power-elite networks” (pangen cuojie de bendi
quanli jingying wangluo) bringing together officials, the
new economic elite, and religious forces to form what the
report calls a “new aristocracy” (xin gui jieceng). “Stability”
has taken precedence over all other goals, and local elites
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can easily manipulate government policies to consolidate
their own power. Here the report uses terminology that
seems to be borrowed from Wang Lixiong’s analysis of the
“bureaucratic clique” that has taken over the governance of
Tibet under the banner of “anti-separatism.” (16) Too many
cadres are chosen for political reasons and seriously lack any
technical or administrative competence (III.2.[2]).
Adopting Gongmeng’s usual approach to legal problems, the
report explicitly states that “with an attitude of ‘policies from
above, countermeasures from below,’ local authorities con-
travene the Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy
Law, but at present the corresponding supervisory and
accountability systems are still incomplete.” (III.2.[2])“ Mode rni sa tion” :  Soci al  a ndcult ura l  pr ob le ms
Echoing many Chinese commentators, Wang Hui wonders
why, as the material situation of Tibetans has consistently
improved (even during the Cultural Revolution, subsidies
did not cease), the tensions in Tibet have worsened since
1980. His main thesis is that the Tibetan problem must be
seen within the nationwide context: the unprecedented eco-
nomic development that took place after 1980 has created
growing disparities and conflicts within Chinese society, as
mirrored in the exponentially increasing number of “mass
incidents.” Wang Hui cites three trends in reform-era China
that are, in his view, related to the specific problems of
Tibet: “depoliticisation” (the end of class-based politics),
the revival of religion, and the marketisation of society (p.
183). He disagrees with an article published by Fred
Halliday in Open Democracy comparing Tibetans and
Palestinians as examples of “post-colonial sequestration”:
nations that missed the opportunity for independence
because they did not obtain international recognition at a
crucial moment. (17) For him the “decolonisation” of Tibet
has little relation with present-day problems: although the
“democratic reforms” of 1959 entailed unnecessary vio-
lence, encountered some strong opposition, and led to
excesses in areas such as religion, Wang Hui believes they
were ultimately justified and benefited a majority of
Tibetans because they established the principle of egalitari-
an politics and the separation of politics and religion: 
From the 1950s to the 1980, Tibet underwent all sorts
of crises, conflicts, and even destruction (for example
the excessive policies of the “democratic reform” peri-
od and the eradication of religion and destruction of
cultural heritage during the Cultural Revolution), but
they had a completely different significance from the
present-day “Tibet problem.” (p. 184) 
While this reviewer is not in disagreement with Wang Hui’s
argument, it should be pointed out, for the sake of the argu-
ment, that his “ultimate justification” of sometimes violent
policies in the name of principles such as equality and secu-
larism is subject to exactly the same criticism of “knowing
better” as what he derides as Western Orientalism. 
The current crisis, on the contrary, is rooted in the Reform
era and linked by Wang Hui to his theory of “depoliticisa-
tion,” which criticises the belief that government can be
handled without significant political debate between oppos-
ing lines. (18) In the revised paper, quoting Peking University
sociologist Ma Rong’s analyses of labour migration and eth-
nic inequalities in the TAR, (19) as well as the Gongmeng
report, Wang Hui emphasises several major problems that
appeared after 1980. Recognising religion and atheism as
“two roads to modernity,” equally respectable and desir-
able, he highlights that government atheism is a major
obstacle to the integration of Tibetan identity within
Chinese identity. Quoting from the Gongmeng report, he
notes that while land reform and its benefits served as a
foundation for the legitimacy of the CCP among the older
generation, the post-1980 reforms did not allow for a simi-
lar identification among younger generation; in this sense
the 2008 revolt can be seen as a “crisis of post-socialism.”
The Gongmeng report also underscores that while the
“modernisation movement held important political signifi-
cance aimed at promoting a new political legitimacy” (I.1),
enforcing the household contract responsibility system
(chengbao), and allowing non-Tibetans to start their own
businesses in Tibetan areas (I.1.[2]), its results, in terms of
legitimacy, were not as good as expected: “The core of poli-
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16. See the translated extract from Wang Lixiong’s “Roadmap of Tibetan independence” in
the present issue, and the full translation to be published as: Wang Lixiong, The Struggle
for Tibet, London, Verso, 2009.
17. See: F. Halliday, “Tibet, Palestine and the politics of failure,” 13 May 2008,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ article/tibet-palestine-and-the-politics-of-failure (12
July 2009). 
18. While this is certainly a defendable opinion, in particular as applied to debates in the
1920s and 1930s, this reviewer does not share Wang Hui’s positive evaluation of Mao’s
use of a “highly subjective concept of class” to “stimulate renewal of the Party’s politi-
cal culture” in the 1960-1966 period, after Mao had broken away from Moscow, and
before the Cultural Revolution degenerated into factional “bureaucratisation” (and there-
fore depoliticisation). See Wang Hui, “Depoliticized politics, from East to West,” New Left
Review, no. 41 (Sept.-Oct. 2006), pp. 29-45, in particular pp. 36-37; Wang Hui, “Politique
de dépolitisation et caractère public des medias de masse,” Extrême-Orient, Extrême-
Occident, no. 31 (2009); Wang Hui, Qu zhengzhi hua de zhengzhi. Duan 20 shiji de
zhongjie yu 90 niandai (Depoliticized politics: A conclusion to the short twentieth centu-
ry and the 1990s), Beijing, Sanlian, 2008.
19. See also note 13 above. 
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
105N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
cies throughout all Tibetan areas increasingly fell into the
logic of ‘development,’ a focus on economic development and
a process of modernisation led by the Han nationality. (…)
Tibet’s own economy, based on traditional agriculture, had
not truly developed or become dynamic” (I.1.[2]). Quoting
Andrew Fischer, and Ma Rong’s concept of a “diffusion
[kuo san] model of modernisation,” which “cannot escape
the notion of a uniform ‘great unity’ [da yitong] and a narrow
understanding of development equated with Hanisation”
(I.2.[1]), the report shows how Tibetans continue to be
excluded by a low level of education (entailed by a lack of
funding, low salaries, a low level of competence among teach-
ers, and failure to implement teaching of vocational skills),
linguistic difficulties, and lack of access to various types of
resources, including social “connections.” Detailing the
mechanisms of economic exclusion (difficulties in obtaining
credit and opening businesses), the report concludes that
modernisation has had “divisive consequences” (fenlie xing
houguo) and has marginalised Tibetans in Lhasa itself: 
When the land you are accustomed to living in, and
the land of the culture you identify with, when the
lifestyle and religiosity is suddenly changed into a
“modern city” that you no longer recognize; when
you can no longer find work in your own land, and
feel the unfairness of lack of opportunity, and when
you realize that your core value systems are under
attack, then the Tibetan people’s panic and sense of
crisis is not difficult to understand. (I.2.[2])
This sense of crisis may be seen, for the authors of the
report, as the main reason behind the revolts of 14 March.
For Wang Hui, decollectivisation and economic privatisation
have entailed, in Tibet as in many other places in the world,
a serious peril for traditional culture. Modernisation and
globalisation represent a direct challenge to religion: both to
religious values, which are marginalised, and to religious
structures (monasteries and lamas), which become corrupt
and lose their moral authority. Similarly, the problem of lan-
guage should be seen in a global context: for Wang Hui the
pressure exercised by Chinese on Tibetan is similar to the
one exercised by English on Chinese, with the difference
that, as he was once told by a participant in a conference,
“the term Han is itself a historical construct, and their lan-
guage contains elements from many other ethnic groups.
The Sino-Tibetan language has a common origin, and using
a modern notion of the nation to draw borders can only be
harmful to communication between people” (p. 186).
Needless to say, given the nonexistent degree of intercom-
municability between Tibetan and Chinese, both spoken
and written, this comment seems at best naïve. 
The impact of modernisation on traditional lifestyles is not
specific to Tibet. However, in the revised paper Wang Hui
notes, as do the Gongmeng researchers, that there is a spe-
cific Tibetan dimension to all these aspects of the crisis, in
that opposition to religion and blind worship of development
and modernity are, in Tibet, associated with Han people
(“when modernisation is equated with Hanisation, the con-
flict between religion and atheism becomes a conflict
between Han and Tibetans”; revised, p. 42); however, he
also underlines that in other contexts, what is termed
“Hanisation” would be called “Westernisation,” “globalisa-
tion,” or “advance of capitalism” (revised, p. 42). Finally, the
problem of the influx of migrant labour is not specific to
Tibet, but in this case also, Wang Hui notes, “Although the
whole of Chinese society is experiencing the problem of the
gap between rich and poor, in ethnic areas the wealth gap is
very closely connected with the difference in traditions, cus-
toms, language, and the position in the economic market that
exists between ethnic groups” (revised, p. 45). He therefore
pleads against further economic liberalisation (“formal equal-
ity”) and for a “politics of recognition” (Charles Taylor). (20)P ol it i cal  s oluti ons?
The real stake in the Tibetan problem is therefore for Wang
Hui to define a type of development in which not only indi-
Wang Hui, 
Depoliticized Politics, 2008. 
20. Taylor is quoted at length, including his conceptual diptych of a “politics of pride” (in a
hierarchical, ancien régime context), to be replaced by a “politics of dignity” (in a 
modern, egalitarian, context).
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viduals, but also weak groups—ethnic minorities, women, or
migrants—are granted equal rights. This problem of reconcil-
ing equality and difference has not found satisfactory solu-
tions in Western societies in which minority groups use
“identity politics” to obtain “recognition” of their differ-
ences, thereby fracturing (fenlie) society. A real “politics of
dignity” (Taylor) implies the equal expression of different
cultures within the public sphere, as well as respect for
diverse opinions within each ethnic group. Therefore, “the
‘Han/Tibetan conflict’ framework must be done away with,
and a new politics of equality must be formulated, a more
inclusive public space must be created, and, under new his-
torical circumstances, the voices of ordinary people must be
given a substantial chance to express themselves within this
public space” (p. 188). This is certainly a praiseworthy
objective and one that the Chinese government often
impedes, not only in Tibet, but in many other parts of
China, by controlling the press and local NGOs. (21)
For all these reasons, the Tibetan problem is a complex
refraction of the challenges that face Chinese society as a
whole. Toning down—though not erasing completely—his
earlier denunciation of Western attacks on China (he uses
fan Zhongguo rather than fan Hua in the final version,
implying that Western public opinion was critical of the
Chinese government rather than of the Chinese people), he
also notes: “When attacking Western public opinion, the
Chinese media never focused on the deep crisis in Tibetan
society; the whole of society did not make use of this turn-
ing point to reflect on and rethink the connection between
the logic of development in contemporary Chinese society
and the Tibetan crisis” (revised, p. 48).
Wang Hui takes care to draw a line between himself and cer-
tain “New Left” viewpoints: “It must be explained that my
discussion of a crisis in a situation of ‘depoliticisation’ does not
stem from nostalgia for the socialist era; it is meant to point
out an often overlooked aspect: the Tibetan crisis is part of the
general post-socialist crisis of the whole of China” (revised,
p. 40). However, he continues to endorse the appearance of
a “patriotic student movement,” which has “burst onto the
screens of the stultified official Chinese media,” finally provid-
ing a true image of the “unofficial” (minjian) China by
defending the Olympic torch relay. This movement implicitly
exemplifies the “repoliticisation” that is his favoured solution
to the Tibetan problem, as opposed to a “depoliticised” devel-
opmentalism promoted by the government (and the West).
While taking care to state that student demonstrators may
have had various motivations, he still links this movement to a
universal symbol (the Olympic flame), and understands it as
an opposition to Western hegemony (that deprived Beijing of
the Olympics through “political manoeuvring” in 1993), and
an endorsement of equality and inclusiveness in a multicultur-
al society. However, he no longer refers to 1919, 1936, and
1989, or to the movement’s difference from “European
nationalism, especially the type of imperialism based on racist
views” (p. 189 (22)). 
For the Gongmeng report, on the other hand, the solutions
are to be found in more pragmatic measures. Pointing out
that, in the process of modernisation, “the systems in
advanced countries should not be blindly copied,” the report
advocates utilising Tibetan Buddhism, which “not only
should not be regarded as an obstacle to modernisation, but
should actually be regarded as a reliable traditional resource
for providing a functional basis for promoting the process of
modernization in Tibetan areas.” Noting that “religion can
go fully hand in hand with modernisation,” it criticises the
government’s, and especially local officials’, continued dis-
trust of religion (V), as exemplified by the unreasonable
retaliation against monks after the March revolts (IV).
In conclusion, this reviewer finds much to agree with in Wang
Hui’s views on Tibet, especially in the revised version of the
article. The multiethnic ideal that is, at least in name,
enshrined in the Chinese constitution deserves to be upheld. It
is more difficult to endorse his indictment of the “European”
ideology of nationalism and the heritage of colonialism as caus-
es for the radicalisation of Tibetans, (23) ignoring the role of the
Chinese state in legitimising the discourse on ethnic divisions.
This critique seems all the more anachronistic at a time when
the slow institutionalisation of the EU has, despite its short-
comings, called into question the exclusiveness of the nation-
state framework, both by granting substantial autonomy to
regional sub-divisions and by accepting the overarching frame-
work of the Union (in particular the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights, enforced by the European Court of
Justice, as a last resort in legal matters, with binding force for
all member states), in an echo of Europe’s century-old dialec-
tic history of fragmentation and reunification, not unlike
China’s. However, his plea for a “politics of dignity” rather
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21. Wang Hui often uses Habermas’s notion of “public space” and “publicness”
(Öffentlichkeit or gonggongxing), whose relationship with Carl Schmitt’s “politicisation”
can only remain uneasy. 
22. This assertion echoes an interview given to the Economic Herald two days before Wang
Hui by Hong Kong University researcher Gan Yang, who similarly describes the torch
protests as the birth of a new cosmopolitanism. See: “Ziqiang, zili, zixin, ziyou de
Zhongguo” (A self-strengthening, self-sustaining, self-confident and free China), Ershiyi
shiji jingji baodao, 26 April 2008.
23. Wang Hui quotes the example of how funding by Western NGOs encourages Tibetans to
underscore their ethnic identity.
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than formal equality through further marketisation in minority
areas is also an important statement, and it is worth reflecting
on his arguments in favour of the autonomy system as the only
possible framework for such a policy.
The analysis of dissatisfaction among Tibetans, its connec-
tion with the growing inequalities all over China, the expres-
sion of this dissatisfaction in “mass incidents” directed at cor-
rupt or incompetent officials, and the resistance to certain
forms of modernisation and secularism, are all convincing.
Wang Hui’s singling out, in his revised paper, of the specific
form taken by these problems in Tibetan areas—the link
between modernisation and Hanisation, the disempower-
ment of Tibetans in their own cities—is welcome, and under-
scores the importance of the findings in the Gongmeng
report, which are quite impressive in their wide-ranging and
systemic nature, especially concerning the importance of reli-
gion, the role of the local bureaucracy, and the formation of
a new “aristocracy” in Tibet. It is important to note that all
these points are analysed and publicised by Chinese
researchers working within Chinese institutions. Even more
noteworthy is the fact that both analyses accept that the legit-
imacy of the administration of Tibet (at least of the TAR) is
not a given, or an incontestable legacy of history; much rather
they argue that Maoist collectivization and redistribution poli-
cies provided Beijing with legitimacy in the eyes of Tibetan
public opinion, and that this legitimacy has, since then, been
severely eroded, and must be reconquered.
It is certainly to be hoped that Wang Hui’s call for a truly
free and inclusive public space can bring together Chinese
and Tibetan critical voices, although one cannot help won-
dering, in this connection, whether the idealistic Chinese
youth extolled at the end of the article might not find a cause
more likely to be shared by their Tibetan counterparts in
defending this public sphere and its accessibility to all rather
than (albeit universal) symbols such as the Olympic flame.
This call for diverse voices is substantiated by references to
the Gongmeng report, Ma Rong’s research, and also to sev-
eral (unnamed) Tibetan friends and colleagues.
Interestingly, Wang Hui does not mention Wang Lixiong or
the signatories of the “Twelve proposals” to deal with the sit-
uation in Tibet (24); when calling for diverse voices among
Tibetan intellectuals to be heard, he also does not mention
that many of these voices can express themselves only in
Tibetan. However, these initiatives and debates attest to
both the possibility and the crucial importance of an
informed and dispassionate discussion on Tibet within
China, as well as between Chinese, Tibetan and Western
analysts. Tibetans and Tibetologists may not all agree with
their strong socio-economic bend or their unwillingness to
discuss alternative solutions to Beijing rule in Lhasa; howev-
er there remains much common ground for discussion, even
in areas like religion and cultural rights.
As highlighted in the recommendations of the Gongmeng
report, the question of modernity remains at the centre of
the discussion. Wang Hui ties his observations to the exis-
tence of an “other” modernity, which he implies was sporad-
ically embodied in the multi-ethnic, anti-nation-State, non-
capitalist “Chinese” path that unfolded over the last centu-
ry, including during at least some of the last 60 years in the
PRC; (25) it is certainly no less legitimate than the develop-
mentalist, bureaucratic, nation-state centred path that has
dominated in Europe. The crisis of the latter in recent years
in China is well-documented, especially in its environmental
and bureaucratic consequences. Nonetheless, it remains a
little paradoxical that Wang Hui, who upholds the specifici-
ty of “Chinese modernity” and also, in his revised paper, of
a Tibetan modernity characterised by a special relationship
with religion, does not ask to what extent the present politi-
cal institutions within the PRC allow Tibetans to make their
own choices on this subject. While the conclusions of the
Gongmeng report and Wang Hui’s revised paper share
many commonalities, the report’s recommendation no. 7
deserves to be particularly emphasised:
Promote rule of law in governance processes in
Tibetan areas. Urge the introduction of laws and reg-
ulations as represented by ordinances in the TAR
and other autonomous areas, to change the current
status quo of a lack of lower laws since the promulga-
tion of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.
Regulate the ownership rights and disposal rights of
key natural resources. Encourage participation by
experts in advising and discussing all aspects of policy
in Tibetan areas. (VI)
“Repoliticisation” cannot take place without institutions—
here the lack of a bridge between a Habermassian public
space and a Schmittian oppositional politics becomes partic-
ularly acute—and it is well worth reflecting on which institu-
tions would serve the purpose most adequately. •
107N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
24. See Wang Lixiong et al., “Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation, by
Some Chinese Intellectuals,” The New York Review of Books, Vol. 55, No. 8, 15 May 2008
(See http://www.nybooks.com/ articles/21379). 
25. See note 18 above. This is of course debatable, as many proponents of “Chinese moder-
nity” such as Zhang Binglin, or of Asian modernity, such as Takeuchi Yoshimi, were
strongly opposed to the Chinese Communist Party’s policy. 
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